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This paper implements an empirical test of market power for Brazilian
banking based on Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). A dynamic version of
the test is applied. The results show that the banking industry in Brazil is
highly competitive, although the perfect competition hypothesis is rejected.
The hypothesis that Brazilian banks behave like a cartel arrangement is also
rejected.
,QWURGXFWLRQ
The Brazilian banking industry, like in many other countries, is highly concentrated.
The five-bank concentration ratio ranges from 49.7% [for total assets] to 55.3% [for
total loans], and to 57.9% [for total deposits] according to data for June 2000. Although
concentration does not necessarily imply that the market is imperfect, it is small wonder
that suspicions about cartel behavior amongst Brazilian bankers are frequently raised in
the country.
2
The aim of this paper is to perform an empirical test to evaluate the degree of
competition in Brazilian banking. The main result reported here is that the available
evidence suggests that the banking industry in Brazil can be described as highly
competitive, although not perfect competitive. The hypothesis that Brazilian banks
behave collusively is strongly rejected.
                                                          
1 Banco Central do Brasil and Universidade de São Paulo
2 See, for example, “Acordo para não baixar juros”, -RUQDOGR%UDVLO, 24.06.2000.5
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the methodology to be
applied in the paper. Section 3 makes the transition to the empirical implementation of
the model. Section 4 describes the empirical data. Section 5 presents the main results.
Section 6 concludes.
0HWKRGRORJ\
The methodology followed in this paper borrows from the approach developed by
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) to identify and empirically measure the degree of
market competition in an industry [see Breshanan (1989) for a survey]. This
methodology has been applied to bank studies for places such as Colombia [Barajas HW
DO. (1999)], Uruguay [Spiller and Favaro (1984)], Canada [Shaffer (1993)], the United
States [Shaffer (1989)], Finland [Vesala (1995)] and a group of some European
countries [France, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and United
Kingdom by Neven and Röller (1999)].
The empirical evidence is diverse. The above mentioned studies reach the conclusion
that the banking industry is competitive in Canada, in the United States, and in
Colombia. The Uruguayan banking can be represented as a Stackelberg oligopoly model
of leaders and followers. The Finnish banking shows imperfect competition but no
cartelization. Finally, there is evidence of cartel behavior for the European banks.
The model to be estimated below supposes that the long-run demand function for bank
loans can be represented by the following expression:
() < U < U /
/ / ln ln ln 3 2 1 a a a + + = (1)
where / is the aggregate amount of bank loans in real terms, U
/ is the market loan
interest rate in real terms, < is an index of economic activity, and a1, a2, and a3 are
coefficients to be estimated.6
As emphasized by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), the interaction term between U
/
and ln< rotates the demand curve for bank loans, which permits the identification of the
market power parameter.
To complete the model, it is necessary to specify the bank behavior. Assume that a bank
L is able to raise an amount 'L of deposits in real terms by promising to pay U
’ of interest
in real terms. Deposits are subject to required reserves. Let m be the required reserve
ratio. Apart from the required reverses, bank assets are composed of bank loans and
public bonds. Let U
% be the real interest rate paid on public bonds. The balance sheet for
bank Lis then given by:
L L L L % / ' ' + + = m (2)
where %L is the amount of public bonds held by bank L in real terms.
The profit function in real terms for an individual bank L is expressed as:




L ' / & ' U U / U U , ] ) 1 [( - - - + - = P m (3)
where &(/L'L) is the resource cost incurred by bank L to raise deposits 'L and grant
loans /L.
Assume that the cost function &(/L'L) is additive separable on its arguments. Assume
further that bank L takes the interest rate on public bonds U
% as given. Under such
assumptions, the bank activities in the loan and in the deposit markets can be treated as
separable. Market power issues in the deposit market are not considered here.
3 The first

























Assume that the loan marginal cost can be described by the following expression:
L L
L
L ] Z /
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where Z is the price of the inputs and ]L is a factor controlling for the quality of the
output, measured here by loan losses, and b1, b2, and b3 are coefficients to be estimated.
After making use of equation (1) and replacing equation (5) in (4), one gets an
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where  L / / ln ln ¶ ¶ = l . In words, l measures the percent response of the market
supply of loans to a one percent increase in the loan supply by bank L.
The l coefficient is the crucial parameter that summarizes the degree of average market
power in the industry. If the banking industry is characterized by perfect competition
then l equals zero. In the other extreme, in the case of monopoly or cartel behavior, the
l parameter equals one. In the intermediary case of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly l is
equal to the inverse of the number of banking firms in the industry.
Note that the l coefficient is identified only when the a3 coefficient on the interaction
term is different from zero.
Shaffer (1993) argues that the l coefficient can be estimated without bias as long as the
sample data encompasses at least one complete market. If the analyzed industry is made
up of multiple markets then the estimated l represents the average degree of market
power over the various markets. It is not necessary that all the individual banks in the
                                                                                                                                                                         
3 See Suominen (1994) for a model where market power in both deposit and loan markets are jointly
investigated.8
sample have the same market power. The l coefficient reflects the behavior of the
average bank (representative bank) in the sample. If, for example, a reduced group of
banks behaves in a cartel like arrangement while the remaining banks behave
competitively, then the estimated l would be a weighted average of the collusive and
competitive values.
The model developed thus far is a static one. However, when applied to Brazilian data
static models suffer from severe misspecification problems. Besides, given the high
frequency data used in the empirical section, a dynamic model allowing for adjustments
over time of the endogenous variables is more appropriate. Steen and Salvanes (1999)
extend Bresnahan-Lau’s approach to a dynamic context. Their approach is followed
here and described in the next section.
(PSLULFDO0RGHO
The starting point is to write the dynamic versions of the loan demand function (1), and
of the bank first order condition (6). Assume that auto-regressive distributed lag (ADL)
models are suitable to describe them. The error-correction (ECM) representation of such
models are respectively given by:
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(8)9
where D is the first-difference operator, eW and hW are the statistical error terms, and
1
3 1
* ) ln (
- + = W W < < a a .
Without loss of generality, equations (7) and (8) are written with the same lag order for
all variables. In the empirical estimation, the lag orders can be different for different
variables. The subscript identifying individual banks is dropped from (8) on the basis
that aggregate data will be used in the empirical analysis.
The specification in first-differences account for the use of non-stationary data. Unit
root tests applied to the variables do not reject the hypothesis that the variables are
integrated of order one I(1).
The error-correction model is a synthetic way to combine the modeling of the short-run
dynamics with the consideration of the adjustments of the dependent variable towards
its equilibrium level.
The error-correction specification is consistent with the presence of co-integration for
the variables. Co-integration tests performed for the two sets of variables are reported in
the next section. They do not reject the existence of at least one co-integration vector for
each of the systems.
The estimation of the long-run parameters in the model given by equations (7) and (8) is
done through the transformation due to Bårdsen (1989). The Bårdsen transformation
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(10)
The long-run parameters of the model (7)-(8) can be recovered from the model (9)-(10)







3 , 2 , 1 ,




















Statistical inference about the long-run parameters is possible through the computation
of the variance of the estimated coefficients using a linear approximation to the variance
of the ratios in (11):
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where a hat over a variable indicates its estimated value, var(.) is the estimated variance
of the respective estimated coefficient and cov(.,.) is the estimated covariance between
the respective estimated coefficients.
The empirical model to be implemented in the next sections take equations (9) and (10)
as the benchmark for the analysis.11
'DWD
The sample refers to aggregate data for Brazilian banks observed on a monthly basis
during the period from August 1994 to August 2000. The use of data for the period
previous to July 1994 is avoided due to the regime shift introduced with the launching
of the stabilization program in that month.
The volume of bank loans refer to the freely allocated fixed rate bank credit, which
excludes from the total bank loans those operations related to credit extended at floating
rates, transfers of external funds, credit extended at binding interest rate ceilings, and
earmarked resources. The lending interest rate is the weighted average of the interest
rate for each bank for the same operations.
The index of economic activity is the index of industrial production as compiled by
IBGE. Both the amount of bank lending as well as the index of economic activity have
been seasonally adjusted by the application of the multiplicative X-11 method.
The interest rate on public bonds is a monthly compounded overnight rate (Selic).
The price of inputs is approximated by the ratio of administrative costs due to the
business of granting loans to the volume of bank loans. Overall administrative costs are
allocated to the different bank business units according to the participation of each such
unit in the overall bank gross income. The different business units considered in the
paper are the following: freely allocated loan granting, other loan granting, foreign
exchange activities, securities transactions, leasing, and bank services.
Loan losses are calculated as the ratio of net provisions for non-performing loans to the
volume of bank loans. Both loan losses and the price of inputs were calculated using
weighted average data for a sample of seventeen large private banks.12
All variables are transformed in real terms by deflating them according to the increase
in the General Price Index (IGP-DI) calculated by FGV. January 2000 is taken as the
basis period.
Figure 1 shows the behavior of the monthly real interest rate on bank loans and on
overnight operations. The overall trend of both rates is to decrease with the passage of
time. The inflation-adjusted loan interest rate went down from a high of 8.9% p.m. in
October 1995 to a low of 1.6% p.m. in July 2000. By the same token, the inflation-
adjusted market interest rate reduced from a peak of 3.5% p.m. in October 1995 to -









































Loan Rate Overnight Rate
)LJXUH0RQWKO\/RDQDQG2YHUQLJKW,QIODWLRQ$GMXVWHG,QWHUHVW5DWHV
Figure 1 may suggest that the similar behavior of both interest rates left the bank
interest spread, as measured by the difference between them, relatively constant


















































L O O L R Q
Bank Spread Loans
)LJXUH0RQWKO\%DQN6SUHDGDQG%DQN/RDQV
Bank interest spread also witnessed an overall decreasing trend over the period, having
reached a peak of 6.0% p.m. in January 1995. By the end of the sample period, bank
interest spread was at its lowest level, bottoming at 2.3% p.m.
After reaching a high of around R$ 95,000 million in the immediate aftermath of the
stabilization program, bank credit suffered a dent following the restrictive monetary
policy pursued in 1995 and the subsequent banking crisis. The recovery that started in
late 1996 was interrupted one year later with the eruption of the Asian crisis. The
upsurge in the granting of banking loans was resumed with the currency flotation and
the shift in monetary policy regime towards an inflation target in 1999.
Figure 3 shows roughly that the same events underlying the upswings of the bank loans
were also responsible for the fluctuations observed in the index of economic activity.
The marked difference between the two series is the faster recovery of economic

















































This section presents the results of the empirical estimation of expressions (9) and (10)
using monthly data for Brazil. Each of these equations was estimated via two stage least
squares (2SLS) to account for endogeneity problems. All contemporaneous right side
variables are treated as endogenous in the estimations.
The instruments for equation (9) include the first difference of the inflation rate, the first
difference of the terms of trade, the first difference of the real overnight interest rate,
and the first two lags of the latter variable.
4 The instrument set for equation (10) is
composed of the contemporaneous and the first two lags of the first difference of the
inflation rate, the first difference of the logarithm of the index of economic activity, and
the first difference of the required reserve ratio. The validity of each instrument set is
tested via the Sargan over-identification test.15
The lag order in the unrestricted version of the models is seven for every variable (i.e., N
is taken to be equal to seven). This lag order was chosen on the basis of two criteria,
namely: a) the elimination of residual serial correlation, and b) the statistical
significance of the explanatory variables at the chosen lag order.
A general-to-specific approach was then pursued through the elimination of the
statistically insignificant variables. In the face of the reduced degrees of freedom for the
available sample, only those variables for which the estimated coefficients implied
probabilities for the W statistics below 20% were dropped from the models. The validity
of the imposed restrictions was tested via the ) test.
The results for the restricted model for the demand for bank loans is reported in Table 1.
The estimates of the long run parameters and their standard errors are calculated from
(11) and (12), respectively. The bottom of the table reports a test of the overall
significance of the model, Sargan’s over-identification test, an ) test for residual serial
auto-correlation, an ) test for ARCH residuals, a normality test for the residuals, and an
) test for the validity of the imposed zero restrictions on the insignificant coefficients.
5
                                                                                                                                                                         
4 Terms of trade is defined as the ratio of exports to imports price. This variable is calculated by
FUNCEX.
5 The same block of information is also reported at the bottom of Table 2.16
9$5,$%/( 3$5$0(7(5 (67,0$7( 67$1'$5'
(5525
W9$/8(
&RQVWDQW g0 -1.7386 2.3648 -0.735
Dln/W￿￿ g1,1 -0.3745 0.1744 -2.148
Dln/W￿￿ g1,2 0.3658 0.1762 2.076
DU
/
W g2,0 186.70 95.469 1.956
DU
/
W￿￿ g2,2 121.19 67.593 1.793
DU
/
W￿￿ g2,3 -27.932 18.251 -1.530
DU
/
W￿￿ g2,4 118.83 53.412 2.225
DU
/
W￿￿ g2,5 138.15 46.058 2.999
DU
/
W￿￿ g2,6 150.71 52.204 2.887
Dln<W g3,0 1.4198 1.0015 1.418
Dln<W￿￿ g3,2 1.1786 0.6294 1.872
Dln<W￿￿ g3,4 0.9911 0.5307 1.868
Dln<W￿￿ g3,5 1.1665 0.5518 2.114
Dln<W￿￿ g3,6 1.1847 0.5964 1.987
D(U
/ln<)W g4,0 -38.826 19.909 -1.950
D(U
/ln<)W￿￿ g4,2 -24.865 14.034 -1.772
D(U
/ln<)W￿￿ g4,3 6.0600 3.8369 1.579
D(U
/ln<)W￿￿ g4,4 -24.729 11.151 -2.218
D(U
/ln<)W￿￿ g4,5 -28.742 9.5504 -3.009
D(U
/ln<)W￿￿ g4,6 -31.593 10.914 -2.895
/RQJUXQSDUDPHWHUV
ln/W￿￿ g
* -0.16056 0.0669 -2.400
U
/
W￿￿ a1 598.58 311.85 1.919
ln<W￿￿ a2 4.5509 3.1463 1.446
(U
/ln<)W￿￿ a3 -125.16 65.610 -1.908
se = 0.0306          Model test: c
2(23) = 74.411          Sargan: c
2(2) = 1.1125
AR 1-5: )(5,37) = 1.151     ARCH 5: )(5,32) = 0.534     Normality: c
2(2) = 0.886
Number of observations: 66            Validity of imposed restrictions: )(8,34) = 1.419
7DEOH(VWLPDWHVRIWKH'HPDQGIRU%DQN/RDQV17
The model shows no sign of misspecification. The set of instruments is a valid one
given the non-significance of the Sargan statistics. Finally, the restricted model seems to
be a valid simplification of the unrestricted one.
The signs of the estimated coefficients cannot be directly interpreted due to the
interaction terms. The long run price elasticity can be calculated as U
/(a1 + a3ln<).
Evaluated at the sample means of U
/ and < the own price elasticity is equal to -0.128.
Thus the demand curve for bank loans is downward sloping. However, the inelastic
long-run demand curve suggests that a perfect collusive market structure is not
consistent with the available data. The evidence from the direct estimation of the l
coefficient, to be presented below, confirms such findings.
The estimate of the adjustment parameter g
* is reasonable, indicating the operation of
the error-correction mechanism. In words, when the demand for bank loans deviates
from its long-run path, bank loans are adjusted in the short-term to bring them back on
course.
The significance on the coefficient on the interaction term a3 indicates that the market
power parameter l is identified.
Table 2 records the estimates of the restricted model for the equation for bank interest
spread. The estimated model is well specified and the imposed restrictions are not
rejected. The set of instruments do not reject Sargan’s over-identification test.18
9$5,$%/( 3$5$0(7(5 (67,0$7( 67'(5525 W9$/8(
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D(U
/±U
%)W￿￿ d1,2 -1.0057 0.3030 -3.319
D(U
/±U
%)W￿￿ d1,3 -0.9549 0.2097 -4.555
D(U
/±U
%)W￿￿ d1,4 -0.8715 0.2365 -3.685
D(U
/±U
%)W￿￿ d1,5 -0.6626 0.2498 -2.653
D(U
/±U
%)W￿￿ d1,6 -0.7009 0.1972 -3.554
DZW￿￿ d3,1 -0.4067 0.3046 -1.335
D]W￿￿ d3,2 0.2773 0.0894 3.101
D]W￿￿ d3,3 0.5092 0.1621 3.142
D]W￿￿ d3,4 0.8531 0.2605 3.274
D]W￿￿ d3,5 1.0699 0.3253 3.289
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ln/W￿￿ b1 0.0422 4.6878´10
-3 9.007
ZW￿￿ b2 1.1863 0.3471 3.4173






sh = 0.0023          Model test: c
2(24) = 64.937          Sargan: c
2(8) = 10.515
AR 1-5: )(5,35) = 2.009     ARCH 5: )(5,30) = 0.229     Normality: c
2(2) = 1.857
Number of observations: 65            Validity of imposed restrictions: )(15,25) = 0.1325
7DEOH(VWLPDWHVIRUWKH%DQN,QWHUHVW6SUHDG19
The adjustment parameter d
* indicates that bank interest spread adjusts faster to
deviations from the long-run equilibrium than the demand for bank loans does.
The long-term equation for the bank interest spread has the expected signs for all the
coefficients. The bank interest spread increases when the amount of extended loans
increases, when the price of inputs is higher, and when default losses increase.
The market power parameter l is equal to 0.0017. Despite its small numerical value it is
statistically significant at 5% level. This result hints that Brazilian banks do not behave
competitively. However, this result does not imply that the Brazilian banking industry
works as a cartel. The cartel arrangement hypothesis implies that the market power
parameter l should be equal to one, which is strongly rejected by the data: the W-value to
test this hypothesis is equal to 1165.77.
Even in the short-term, there is evidence that Brazilian banks do not behave
competitively. The estimated short-term market power coefficients are statistically
significant and their numerical values are one order of magnitude smaller than the long-
term market power parameter. This result means that Brazilian banks exercise more
market power in the long rather than in the short-term.
The inference concerning the long-term parameters was based on the approximate
formulas for the variances of the estimated coefficients given by (12). The possible
biases resulting from such approximation are unknown. The robustness of the results
can be checked by means of the co-integration analysis.





% ; ln/; Z; ]; <
*). The first system represents the
demand for bank loans while the latter encompasses the equation for the bank spread.
The results of the co-integration tests are reported in Table 3. The first row of the table
refers to the maximal eigenvalue and to the trace statistics, respectively. The critical
values for both statistics are those from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). In the first column of
the table, U refers to the rank of the long-run matrix of coefficients, which coincides20
with the number of co-integration vectors detected in the system. Seven lags of each
variable are introduced for both systems.
0D[LPDO 7UDFH
Loan demand equation
U = 0 33.07
** 59.88
**
U = 1 16.18 26.81
U = 2 9.16 10.63
U = 3 1.469 1.469
Bank spread equation
U = 0 43.96
** 116.9
**
U = 1 30.92
* 72.95
**
U = 2 22.63
* 42.03
**
U = 3 17.27
* 19.4
*
U = 4 2.123 2.123
* Significant at 5%                   
** Significant at 1%
7DEOH-RKDQVHQ&RLQWHJUDWLRQ7HVWV
The results show that there is evidence of one co-integration vector for the first system
and of three or four co-integration vectors for the second. Such results imply that the
error-correction representation is suitable for the data.
Steen and Salvanes (1999) suggest to test the significance of the coefficient of the
interaction term in the loan demand equation by imposing a zero restriction in the co-
integration vector. Under the restriction that there is one co-integration vector in the
loan demand system, the null hypothesis that U
/ and ln< are separable is rejected by the
data. The test statistics is equal to 12.724 with a c
2(1) asymptotic distribution under the
null hypothesis. This result confirms the previous findings based on the single equation
framework with the implication that the market power parameter l is indeed identified.21
The significance of the market power parameter l can also be alternatively tested by
means of a zero restriction imposed on the coefficient of the <
* variable in the co-
integration vector. Under the assumption that there is one co-integration vector in the
bank spread system, the null hypothesis that Brazilian banks behave competitively is
again rejected. The test statistics is equal to 12.951 with a c
2(1) asymptotic distribution
under the null hypothesis. This result is in agreement with the ones reported above for
the bank spread equation.
Summing up, the available evidence indicates that Brazilian banking is not competitive.
Although the exact form of market structure is not identified it is possible to reject that
Brazilian banks form a cartel.
&RQFOXGLQJ5HPDUNV
This paper adopts Bresnahan-Lau’s approach to test the significance of market power in
Brazilian banking. A dynamic specification is pursued. Error-correction models for both
the demand for bank loans and the bank interest spread are developed.
The results are consistent with the view that Brazilian banks have some market power.
Such market power is more pronounced in the long rather than in the short-term. The
precise market structure is not known but the data strongly rejects that perfect collusion
is practiced by Brazilian banks.
The conclusions reached in this paper are negative rather than positive in the sense that
all that it was possible to infer was that Brazilian banking cannot be described by any of
the two polar market structures, namely perfect competition and monopoly/cartel. It is
left to future research an attempt to refine and better understand the exact nature of
market imperfection characterizing the banking industry in Brazil.22
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